In this paper, I discuss how there has been a recent trend in the philosophy of scientific explanation towards a pluralistic view that acknowledges the importance of both of the major accounts of explanation of the last thirty years- the unificationist account, as proposed in (Kitcher, 1989), and the causal account, primarily as described in (Cartwright, 1983), but with aspects from (Salmon, 1998)- and admits the possibility of other, as yet undiscovered, accounts. Although I believe that a pluralist position is essentially correct, I argue that no satisfactory description has been given of how one determines which explanatory contexts call for which kind of explanation. Limiting my analysis to the contemporary particle physics techniques associated with Effective Field Theories, which I believe offer a particularly good case study for distinguishing between contexts, I argue that the determination of explanatory type from context is a pragmatic issue. To address this issue, I turn to a third account of explanation,the pragmatic account, as described in (van Fraassen, 1980). Although I argue the pragmatic account fails as a full account of explanation, it succeeds, in modified form, in describing the pragmatics of explanation,specifically of the pluralist account. In the end, I argue that explanatory context in particle physics is determined by the relationship between the experimental context in which the person demanding the explanation is interested, and the characteristic energy scale of the phenomenon to be explained. When the experimental context in question overlaps with the characteristic scale of the phenomenon, a causal explanation is called for; if the experimental context is higher than the characteristic scale, then explanatory unification is called for.